


**PORCH: NS 3700**

**The History of Modern Europe, 1800-1990**



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**HISTORY OF MODERN EUROPE**  
**NS 3700**  
**(Spring 2002)**

*"If a major power appears disadvantaged, the international order will remain volatile."* (Henry Kissinger)

**COURSE DESCRIPTION:** This course is designed to help officers to understand the historical foundations of contemporary European politics and society. It will seek to define the major characteristics of the European state system from the French Revolution to the end of the Cold War. It will identify the major influences on the evolution of that system -- ideological, political, social and cultural -- and examine how those pressures led to the erosion and final collapse of the "Concert of Europe" in two world wars. Students will discuss the impact of U.S. intervention in Europe, and examine the European Union as an attempt to rectify the errors of the past, and restore a modernized version of the "Concert" idea. The course will challenge European area specialists to consider how Europe's past informs many European attitudes and responses to the present, and how history may shape the evolution of Continental unity.

**REQUIRED READING:** Sections of the following book will be assigned as required reading in advance of the week in which they will be discussed.

Robert Gildea, *Barricades and Borders. Europe 1800-1914* (Second Edition), (Oxford: OUP, 1996). ISBN 0-19-820625-9

Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent. Europe's Twentieth Century*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1998). ISBN 0-679-75704-X

John Lamberton Harper, *American Visions of Europe*. Cambridge University Press 1996. ISBN 0-521-56628-2

Additional readings are in the Course Reader which is on reserve in the Dudley Knox Library.

**COURSE REQUIREMENTS:** Assessment will be computed on the basis of one open-book, take-home final examination (50%), a briefing assigned to each student during the course of the quarter (30%), and active and informed class participation (20%). All written work must be typed or printed by computer, double-spaced, with 12 point fonts, numbered pages, and at least a 1" margin all around. Work will be graded according to the following standards:

**A+ (98):** Offers genuinely new understanding of the topic. Indicates brilliance.

**A (95):** Work of superior quality that is, at least in part, original.

**A- (92):** Above the average expected of graduate work. An insightful performance.

**B+ (88):** A sound, well executed paper which meets all five standards of an essay listed above.

**B (85):** Average graduate performance. A solid essay that is on the whole a successful consideration of the topic.

**B- (82):** An essay that addresses the question, has a thesis clearly stated but not fully supported, and that either does not consider the topic thoroughly or has structural flaws.

**C+ (78):** Sufficiently analytical to distinguish it from a C, but still lacks the support, structure, or clarity to merit graduate credit.

**C (75):** indicates that the work is barely adequate and fails to meet the standards of graduate work. Expresses a responsible opinion but makes inadequate use of evidence, has little coherent structure, is critically unclear, or lacks the quality of insight deemed sufficient to explore the issue at hand adequately.

**C- (72):** Attempts to address the question, approaches a responsible opinion, but is conspicuously below average in one or more of the elements listed above.

**F (65):** Indicates that the essay has failed to address the question or has resulted from plagiarism.

### BRIEFINGS AND EXAMINATIONS

A good briefing or examination paper will demonstrate five elements: it answers the question asked; it has a thesis; it marshals evidence to support the thesis; it considers, explicitly or implicitly, counter arguments to or weaknesses in the thesis and supporting evidence; and it does the above in a clear and well-organized fashion. You should always keep several things in mind when composing your briefing or examination paper:

1. The briefing or examination is not meant to be a research paper, but your own analysis of the question.
2. Do not repeat history or tell a story. Give only as much general background you need to support your arguments. If you have any doubts about what the question asks, see the professor.
3. Make your points concisely and keep your arguments short.
4. Formulate a **thesis** and state it in your opening paragraph. The thesis is the answer to your question, shortened to one or, at the most two, paragraphs. This will guide the organization of your material. It should be complete and able to stand alone. It should state your main arguments. You should take the counter-arguments on because, if you do not, others certainly will.
5. The conclusion of your paper or briefing should mirror your thesis. If, on completing your paper, you see that your conclusion and thesis do not agree, then perhaps you should adjust your thesis.
6. A poorly organized or sloppily presented briefing detracts from the quality of your argument. Pay attention to spelling and grammar; errors might confuse and distract the audience from the points you wish to make.

### Plagiarism

Plagiarism is against School regulations and may result in expulsion. You are required to give credit when using someone else's **words** or **ideas**. Direct quotations must be surrounded by quotation marks. Footnotes need not be added at the end. Annotation next to the pertinent passage is sufficient, i.e.: (Geyer, 572). Facts or dates need not be annotated.

**SCHEDULE**

**I. INTRODUCTION: The Dominance of Europe (1-3 April, 2000)**

**II. EUROPE'S SEARCH FOR A STABLE BALANCE OF POWER (8-10 April)**

Gildea, *Barricades and Borders*, pp. 3-79

Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored*, Peter Smith (Gloucester, MA, 1973), pp. 191-213

Paul Schroeder, "Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?" *AHR* (97/3/1992), pp 683-705.

John Hutchinson & Anthony D. Smith (eds.), *Nationalism*. OUP (Oxford 1994), selected pages.

**Study Questions:**

1. What factors promoted the break-up of old economic and political patterns at the turn of the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> Centuries? How did changes in demography, agriculture, transportation and financial practices impact the potential for industrialization? How did they facilitate the marriage between technology and the entrepreneur to produce the Industrial Revolution?
2. How do you explain the fact that industrialization impacted some areas of Europe more than others?
3. How do you explain the rise of liberal free-trade ideas in Europe?
4. In what ways did the "modernization" of Europe contribute to its growing instability?
5. In what ways did the Napoleonic regime differ from its predecessors? Was Napoleon merely an 18<sup>th</sup> Century "Enlightened Despot" on a grand scale? Or was he the harbinger of the modern European state? What were the legacies of his regime?
6. The Napoleonic Empire can be seen both as a Common Market and as an attempt at European political integration. What were its strengths? What factors inhibited a concerted European action against Napoleonic hegemony? What were the vulnerabilities of the Napoleonic empire? Why, ultimately, did Napoleon fail?
7. What were the problems of converting the wartime coalition against Napoleon into a peacetime Concert?
8. Identify the main principles of the Vienna settlement. In what ways did they aim to turn the clock back to the era of *ancien régime* Europe? In what ways did the settlement attempt to change past practices?
9. If all powers were not to be equal under Vienna, how did the settlement aim to restore "balance" while guaranteeing stability?
10. What were the national interests of the major powers? Identify potential flashpoints; e.g., where did they conflict?
11. Which of their interests were the powers willing to set aside to preserve a degree of

- balance? Why were they willing to do this?
12. What is hegemony? Was Britain a “hegemon” in 1815? Was Russia?
  13. What makes the European state system “stable:” a balance of power or Schroeder’s notion of peripheral hegemony? Do you agree that Vienna was a “bi-hegemonic system with sub-hegemonies”? Did the Continental powers have anything to fear from Great Britain? From Russia? Must a BOP reside solely on countervailing force? What is the difference between “benign” & “predatory” hegemony? “Hegemony was tolerated because it was ‘benign’.” Do you agree? Schroeder distinguishes between the “rule of law” and BOP. Is this a fair distinction? How effective is “legal and moral” deterrence in a BOP system”
  14. What was Metternich’s vision of the Concert? What did he mean by “legitimacy”? Most modern historians dismiss Metternich as a narrow-minded reactionary. But what were the alternatives to his vision?
  15. Kissinger argues that Metternich’s vision for Europe was that of Austria writ large. Some might suggest that the European Union actually replicates Metternich's Austria in that political decisions are increasingly delegated to insulated, non-majoritarian institutions, national bureaucracies, constitutional courts and central banks. So, is the Vienna settlement "reactionary," or is the "democratic deficit" of Vienna merely "European?"
  16. Who wins/loses at Vienna? Which countries/groups were most likely to spoil the Concert?
  17. Does the Concert resemble the European order today? What role does the U.S. play? Great Britain? Who is Austria? France? Prussia? its persistence in 19<sup>th</sup> Century Europe? Which countries were left most vulnerable to instability, both domestic and international, by Vienna?
  18. What is nationalism? What are its defining characteristics?
  19. What was the basis of the old order in Central and Eastern Europe? How did nationalism challenge this?
  20. Renan argues that "historical falsehoods" are a necessary ingredient of nationalism. What does he mean? Is it the same thing as Hegel's "historic" and "unhistoric" nations?
  21. What particular problems did nationalism confront in Poland? Italy? Hungary? Germany?
  22. Do the Basques, the Welsh or the Scots comprise "nations?" Are Irish Protestants British, Irish, or a separate "nation?"
  23. What is liberalism? Is it a coherent doctrine? Would you say that its main elements are political or economic? Can you have one without the other? What differences, if any, separated liberalism and radicalism? How did each differ in Western and Eastern Europe?
  24. What differentiates liberalism and nationalism from conservatism? How did conservatism adapt to "modernization?"

25. Do you sense a tension between the extreme individualism of the Romantic movement, and the collectivization implied by the political and economic changes at the turn of the nineteenth century? Or do you think that they were opposite sides of the same coin?
26. What are the implications of liberalism and nationalism for the Congress System? How does each challenge Metternich's notion of "legitimacy"? What are the implications of the "collapse" of the Congress System for liberalism and nationalism?

### III. THE BREAK-UP OF THE CONGRESS SYSTEM 1848-1871 (15-17 April)

Gildea: *Barricades and Borders*, 80-100; 137-205

#### Study Questions:

1. Why was Europe so vulnerable to Revolution in 1848? How do you explain the initial success of revolutionary movements in 1848? How do you explain their eventual failure? What role did France play as a catalyst in these revolutions?
2. Are liberalism, nationalism and radicalism complementary movements before 1848? After 1848?
3. What does Gildea mean by the “Revolutionary Tradition?”
4. Why did liberal nationalists fail in 1848 to unite Germany? Italy?
5. What price did Europe pay for the failure of 1848? What changes after 1848? What are the consequences of this for the future of Germany? Of Europe?
6. Why was the cause of nationalism so often associated with war and violence? Could Italy and Germany have been united without war?
7. What were the main trends in trade in this period? How do you explain the expansion of “industrial” crops in Northern Europe? What was the impact on European demography? What was the incentive for “iron and rye” alliances?
8. What factors led to the “Second Industrial Revolution” between 1851 and 1873? How did it help to transform the labor market? The middle classes? Jews? Women? How do you explain the persistence of noble influence in Central and Eastern Europe, compared to the “bourgeois” domination of the West?
9. How do you explain the revival of conservative power in mid-century?
10. What was the Crimean War about? What were the motives of those countries that allied against Russia? What was the impact of the Crimean War on the Congress system? What was the impact of defeat upon Russia?
11. What factors led to the emancipation of Russian serfs in 1861? What was the result?
12. How was “national unification” used to separate nationalism from revolution in Italy? In Germany?
13. How do you account for Cavour’s decision to adopt a regime of extreme administrative centralization in Italy? What were its consequences for Italian stability?
14. Why was not the Congress system more effective in resisting Bismarck’s plans for German unification? Why could not France and Austria not unite to stop him?
15. Gildea argues that “just as united Italy was an extension of Piedmont, so united Germany was only Prussia writ large?” What does he mean? What were the consequences of this for these two states?
16. What were the consequences of the *Ausgleich* of 1867 for the stability of the Austro-

**IV: THE COMING OF THE GREAT WAR (22-24 April)**

Gildea, *Barricades and Borders*, 218-29 (optional); 268-299 (optional); 300-414

**Study Questions:**

1. How do you account for the resilience of conservatism in Europe in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century?
2. How do you account for the conservative slant of Liberal-dominated parties in post-1871 Europe? How did European political leaders manipulate factions to maintain conservatives in power?
3. Why did states in Western Europe come into conflict with the Catholic Church?
4. What were the main demographic and social trends in Europe at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century?
5. What were the main factors promoting socialism? In what ways did Russian socialism develop differently from that of Western European countries? Why was the socialist movement seen as such a threat by European governments before 1914?
6. By the late Nineteenth Century, the economic benefits of Imperialism had been shown to be illusory. How, then, do you account for the explosion of European (as well as American and Japanese) imperialism in the century's last quarter? What the links between Imperialism and nationalism? Liberalism? Navalism?
7. Do you think that it is fair to equate late-century modernism, and its manifestations of anarchism and decadence, with "irrationality?" Do you think that this symbolized a "terrible regression in political and intellectual values" in contrast to Europe's material advancement?
8. While Europe experienced several wars between 1854 and 1870, they all remained limited. Why did they not spread to encompass the entire continent as in 1914?
9. What were the consequences of German unification for European stability? Could Germany have sustained the Bismarckian order in Europe, or was it doomed to failure in the decades following Bismarck's departure from office? Were the major strains on it domestic or international?
10. Why did Germany undertake "Weltpolitik"? What were its strategic objectives? What were the consequences for Germany of its failure? Was there ever any hope that it would succeed?
11. Why did Germany decide to become a naval power? What were its domestic political advantages? What strategic/diplomatic advantages accrued to Germany for having the world's #2 navy?

12. Why did Russia, France and Great Britain, in spite of their traditional animosities, draw together against Germany? Was Germany, as she claimed, a victim of “encirclement” before 1914? What were liberal attitudes toward the causes of war? Why did the nations of Europe go to war against their best customers? Are economic ties ever a barrier to war? What part did Europe’s alliance structure play in transforming a minor crisis in the Balkans into a general conflagration? Why did the “Congress” of Europe able to prevent war in 1905, 1908 and 1911, but failed in 1914?
13. What was the Great War about – domestic politics in Germany and Austria-Hungary, or instability in Eastern and Southeastern Europe? Why did it break out? How do you account for the positions taken by each of the Great Powers in the July crisis of 1914? Which power was the most responsible for the outbreak of war? Might a different position adopted by one or more of the powers have altered the decision for war? Was the outbreak of war merely the result of poor crisis management on the part of Europe’s leaders, or was it the inevitable result of a “crisis of European culture?”

**V. THE GREAT WAR (29 April – 1 May)**

William R. Keylor, *The Twentieth Century. An International History*, 43-91 (selected Readings)

Richard Bessel, *Germany and the First World War*. Chapter 1. “German Society During the First World War” pp 1-48 (selected readings)

J.M. Bourne, *Britain and the Great War*. Edward Arnold, (London, 1989), pp 175-245 (selected readings)

J.N. Westwood, *Endurance and Endeavour*, 203-276 (selected readings)

**Study Questions:**

1. What sort of problems did the need to fight a long war on an unprecedented scale create in European societies? What tensions did this cause between “front” and “rear”?
2. One problem of the Great War was that it had causes but no objectives. Do you agree? What problems might this create for governments? For high commands? How might it impact civil-military relations? How well did governments deal with the need to mobilize and militarize the populations?
3. Why could European governments not end the war once it was clear that “victory” would only come at considerable costs?
4. Why do some states suffer revolution while others do not? Why do the revolutionaries succeed in Russia, but not in Germany?
5. 1917 marks the first intervention by the United States in European affairs. What is the significance of the fact that the United States joined the Allies as a “co-belligerent”? How did the United States employ its forces to achieve maximum political leverage? What were the risks/rewards of the U.S. approach to fighting World War I?
6. FDR was convinced that the U.S. saved the Allies from defeat in World War I. Do you agree? Factor out U.S. intervention in World War I. What would have been Europe’s fate?
7. How did the war alter liberal assumptions about the origins of war and the nature of the peace? “Wilson went to war not to preserve the European BOP, but to destroy it.” Do you agree? If so, why was it so popular?
8. Who do you think had the more realistic vision of how to organize Europe, Wilson or his European counterparts? What were the accomplishments of Versailles? Why was it perceived as a failure -- because Wilsonian liberalism was ill-adapted to European realities, or because Wilson’s vision was sabotaged by Lloyd George, Clemenceau and American isolationism?
9. Accepted wisdom dictates that no country won World War I. Do you agree?
10. What price did European countries pay in World War I? Was it too high? In what

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ways did the Great War change the outlook and attitudes of European society?

**VI. EUROPE BETWEEN THE WARS (6-8 May)**

Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent. Europe's Twentieth Century*, Chapters I, II & IV  
 Bessel, *Germany after the First World War*. Chapter 3. "The Return of the Soldiers" pp 69-90; Chapter 8. "The Post-War transition & The Moral Order" pp 220-53; Chapter 9. "The Legacy of WWI & Weimar Politics" pp 285-314.

**Study Questions:**

1. What were the challenges to the "triumph of liberalism" that seemed to be ushered in by the Allied victory in World War I?
2. How did World War I transform nationalism? What was Versailles' approach to national minorities?
3. What challenges did the transformation of the European situation hold for the "Congress" of Europe? Why did disarmament conferences fail to reduce tensions?
4. Contrast popular attitudes toward the Great War in Britain, France, the United States with those in Germany. Are there differences? If so, how do you account for them?
5. Did democracy fail in Europe because reformers made mistakes? If so, what mistakes did they make? Or did it fail because it had shallow roots?
6. What was the attraction of Totalitarian ideologies in inter-war Europe?
7. Was Weimar doomed? What were its strengths/weaknesses? Might it have survived? Was there any way that the victorious Allies might have punished the leaders of the Kaiserreich while supporting Weimar?
8. Why did Hitler come to power? Can you explain it as the unique product of systemic conditions left over from the Great War? Or was it the result of circumstances and luck? Who might have stopped him before he took power? After he took power? Why did no one do this?
9. What was Hitler's vision for Germany? For Europe? How much did it owe to traditional right-wing ideology, and how much of it was his personal invention? What conditions made his vision a plausible one in 1933? Why did the Germans buy into his vision?
10. Mazower argues that the USSR was the true heir of the Hapsburgs, while Hitler was its rejection? What does he mean?
11. The 1914-1945 period is sometimes referred to as "The Thirty Years' War." Do you agree? Did the way the Great War ended make a second inning inevitable? Or were the two World Wars distinct events with distinct causes?

**VII. EUROPE BETWEEN THE WARS (II): RISING TO THE TOTALITARIAN CHALLENGE (13-15 May)**

PMH Bell, *The Origins of the Second World War*. Longman (New York, 1986), Chapters 7 & 8.

J.N. Westwood, *Endurance and Endeavour*, 302-336

John Lamberton Harper, *American Visions of Europe*, pp 48-76

**Study Questions:**

1. What was the major problem of Europe in the inter-war years? Economic dislocation? Lack of political will? Fear of Revolution?
2. What were the problems confronting Britain and France in the 1930s. How far did challenges from the extremes of Right and Left, fascists and communists, influence political outlooks in France especially? What was the impact of the Depression on domestic policies in the Western democracies.
3. Compare Germany's strategic position in 1914 with that of post-Versailles. Strategically speaking, was Germany better or worse off? Might there be similarities between the strategic situation the strategic situation of the inter-war years and that of Europe in the 1860s, after the Crimean War and before unification?
4. Where was the main "threat" for Great Britain? For France? For Stalin?
5. What was the "Liberal" response to German re-armament? Why was it so inadequate? Given the desire of most European peoples to avoid a repeat of 1914-18, why did concepts like the League of Nations, "collective security" and arms limitation agreements prove so empty of results?
6. What was the rationale of appeasement? Was appeasement a logical response to German rearmament for Britain? For France? For the USSR? What strategic role did the Petite-Entente play? Did the break-p of the Austria-Hungarian Empire help or hinder the stabilization of the European BOP?
7. Mansower argues that "the Versailles approach to minorities problems in eastern Europe expired at Munich."(160) What changes in 1938?
8. How did FDR's vision of Europe's fate differ from that of Wilson? What approaches to the "European problem" were represented in the Roosevelt administration? Realistically, was there anything the United States could do to contribute to European stability in the 1930s? If so, what?
9. What were the alternatives to appeasement? Why could not the countries surrounding Germany reproduce the "encirclement" alliances that prevailed before 1914? What, in your view, should have been the Allied response to the Rhineland re-militarization? To the Anschluss of 1938? To the Sudeten Crisis of 1938? Were the Western Allies wise to declare war over Poland in September 1939?

**VIII. HITLER'S "NEW ORDER," HOLOCAUST, AND RESISTANCE (20-22 May)**

Mazower, *Dark Continent*, Chapters V & VI

John Lamberton Harper, *American Visions of Europe*, pp 77-131

**Study Questions:**

1. Mazower argues that, in 1940, much of Europe was not adverse to a new European order under German leadership. What factors might account for this? Why did potential goodwill toward German rapidly evaporate in Europe?
2. What were the characteristics of Hitler's "New European Order?"
3. In what ways did Total War "radicalize and complicate" (159) Nazi policies toward Europe?
4. Why did Hitler declare war on the United States? What problems did Hitler's declaration of war against the United States resolve for Roosevelt?
5. How did Roosevelt shape U.S. intervention to achieve America's goals? How did his approach differ from Wilson"? Why did FDR believe that American imperialism was superior to the European variety? FDR called the states of Eastern Europe "loose cannon". What, in his view, was the best way to deal with them? In your view, was he right or wrong?
6. "Without the USA, the Allied Powers amounted to little more than a club for invalids." Without the United States, there would have been no "World War II." Do you agree?
7. What were the roots of the Holocaust? Given the prevalence of anti-Semitism throughout Europe, especially in Eastern Europe, why was the Holocaust produced by Germany?
8. How do you explain the Holocaust? Was it always Hitler's intention, or was it the product of wartime circumstance?
9. Could the Holocaust have been stopped? If so, by whom? The Germans? Which ones – the military? The churches?
10. "Critics from more fortunate countries do not always realize how a totalitarian regime drives everyone in its power to varying degrees of complicity. Unfree people should not be judged by the criteria of free societies." Do you think that this excuses European failure to stop, or at least protest, the Holocaust?
11. What could the Allies have done to save Jews? Why did they not do more? Had Hitler began gassing Jews without going to war, would the world have intervened to save them?
12. Might the Jews have done more to save themselves? Should they have practiced

- “passive resistance” as Ghandi advised? Or should the Jews have rebelled?
13. How do you explain the different fates of Jews in different countries?
  14. Who was most responsible for the Holocaust? Hitler alone? A narrow clique of Nazi anti-Semites? All Germans? Or was the problem simply one of bureaucrats who operated according to a narrow code of “legality”? How do you explain the “indifference” of the populations of occupied Europe to the fate of the Jews?
  15. How do you explain the willingness of “ordinary men” to participate in clearly immoral acts?
  16. Is the Holocaust really "unique," or merely one grizzly episode in the wider context of the Nazi terror in general? In the context of World War II? What do you think of the "moral equivalency" argument that the Holocaust must be set against Allied terror bombing, or Stalin's murder of Soviet POW's? "If 'obeying orders' could be no defense for Adolf Eichmann, it can be no defense for Allied officers." (p. 1047) Agree?
  17. "A humiliating legacy of recrimination, misinformation and moral confusion." Do you think that this is the consequence of the Holocaust in Europe?
  18. What factors impelled Europe toward unity from 1943? What were the impediments to that unity?
  19. “Social revolution hardly seems too strong a term to describe the dramatic changes brought about by the war.” (Mansower, 185) What were the elements of this “social revolution?” In what ways did they shape the post-war environment?
  20. In what ways did the war challenge traditional notions of liberal democracy in Europe?
  21. Assess the importance of the Resistance to the atmosphere of post-war Europe.

**IX. REHABILITATING GERMANY, “MODERNIZING” EASTERN EUROPE, AND THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR (29 May)**

Mansower, *Dark Continent*, Chapters VII & VIII  
Harper, *American Visions of Europe*, Part II, 135-232

**Study Questions:**

1. How did war termination in 1945 differ from 1918? How do you account for these differences?
2. One might argue that, with the exception of Yugoslavia, the aftermath of World War II actually realized the “ethnic cleansing” began in World War I? Why did this happen? Did it make Europe any more stable?
3. What does the “Congress” look like after 1945?
4. Was there any way, realistically, to avoid a partition of Europe after 1945? Was Yalta really a sellout, or merely a recognition of reality? Should Eisenhower have seized Berlin/Prague ahead of Soviet forces?
5. Who was responsible for the Cold War? Was it inevitable, or the produce of a series of mistakes and miscalculations? Was Stalin was simply applying “realpolitik” in an attempt to assure his security and rebuild his economy, while the Allies sought from the beginning to apply the “universalist” principles of the Atlantic Charter and democracy?
6. If the “problem of Germany” held the Allies together in WWII, do you think that it was Germany that forced them apart after 1945? Did the Cold War begin with the 1948 Berlin Blockade? Or was this one of several events that escalated into confrontation after 1945?
7. What elements account for the relative popularity of the USSR in much of Eastern Europe after 1945? In what ways did the occupying Soviet forces capitalize on this? What factors made the Soviet Union and communist economic models “popular” in Eastern Europe after 1945?
8. In what ways was Eastern Europe after 1945 different that before the war?
9. Why did the Soviets refuse to accept the Marshall Plan in Eastern Europe? What was their alternative?
10. How do you account for the relative success of communist economic models in Eastern Europe after the war? How do you explain their eventual failure?
11. Mazower argues that Western Europe had been radicalized by the experience of war, occupation and resistance. What factors contributed to the diminution of that radicalism?
12. What were the impediments to the “de-Nazification” of Germany? How successful was the attempt to cleanse the German state of those who had served Hitler?

13. What did Kennan think was wrong with America's post-war policy? Lamberton argues that Kennan's vision for Europe was essentially that of Hitler stripped of its Nazi vulgarity (216). Is this fair? Or is Kennan's prediction not the situation, more-or-less, of the contemporary EU?

#### X. REBUILDING "DEMOCRACY" (3-5 June)

Mansower, *Dark Continent*, Chapters IX & X, and Epilogue  
 Harper, *American Visions of Europe*, Part III, 235-341

#### Study Questions:

1. Mansower argues that the democracy that emerged in Western Europe after 1945 was very different from its inter-war predecessor. What had changed? How did social and political environments differ?
2. How does the desire for social solidarity in post-War Western Europe conflict with the requirement to protect the individual from the excesses of the state. How were these apparently conflicting tendencies reconciled?
3. Although the Right, even the extreme Right, should have been discredited by the war, in fact, it proved extremely resilient. How do you explain its relative popularity in post-war Western Europe?
4. What particular challenges did the Left face in post-war Europe? How did Social Democratic parties adapt to the changed political environment?
5. Do you think that the main factor that accounted for the failure of democracy in the inter-war years as opposed to its success in Western Europe post-1945 was the economy?
6. Mazower argues that post-War European democracy has succeeded by "the middle classes turning radical agendas to their own ends."(301) What does he mean by this?
7. What factors account for the post-war "economic miracle" in Western Europe? How important was the Marshall Plan in Europe's economic recovery? Of American economic influence generally?
8. How do you explain anti-Americanism in Europe? In which areas/ sectors/ countries is anti-Americanism most pronounced? In which is it weaker?
9. What challenges did immigration pose to traditional European notions of national community? In which countries has immigration become a most divisive issue? Why?

10. “Acheson’s legacy was the kind of American entanglement, or hegemony, in Europe that the Europeans themselves wanted or were prepared to accept.” (Lamberton 328) Why were they prepared to accept U.S. “hegemony.” What tensions did the continued U.S. presence in Europe after 1945 cause among European states?
11. Harper argues that Kissinger is the heir to the Jefferson/Wilson/FDR attitudes toward Europe, while Brzezinski shares Kennan’s views. What does he mean?
12. The cause of European unity picked up speed in the 1980s. How do you account for this?
13. Is the EU a new Congress of Vienna? Or is it an updated version of Hapsburg Empire minus Franz Joseph, a shambling house of cards held together by bureaucratic regulation, economic self-interest and fear of Europe’s centrifugal forces? What is the basis of its “legitimacy”?
14. One problem the BOP was meant to deal with was potential hegemony. Do you believe that the EU provides a structure to deal with potential hegemony? Is this a price worth paying for giving up a great deal of national sovereignty?
15. How do you think Europe’s vision of itself has changed over the course of the last century? Do you agree with Mazower’s assessment that the end of the Cold War has resulted in disillusionment?
16. What are the particular challenges, in your view, to European unity? Do you agree with Mazower’s assessment that Europe is more capitalist than democratic?
17. The break-up of the USSR has been hailed as “the most important transitional period in the history of international relations in this century.” What are its implications for the success of the “European ideal”? What will Russia’s (temporary) eclipse mean for “loose canon” states of Eastern Europe? For the EU?
18. Kissinger argues that American ambivalence toward European unity is shared by the Europeans themselves. What does he mean?

**XI. FINAL EXAMINATION (Distributed 5 June. Due by COB, 14 June)**

